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Abstract
We propose a safe exchange mechanism involving indivisible goods and divisible goods. A typical
situation is an exchange involving goods and money in a person-to-person trade in an Internet
auction. Although the Internet and agent technologies have facilitated world-wide trade, we
sometimes encounter risky situations, such as fraud, in the process of exchanges involving goods
and money. This problem is becoming more serious with the growing popularity of person-to-person
trade. One of the reasons why fraud is becoming widespread is that obtaining a new identifier in
a network is cheap. This makes it almost impossible to exclude malicious agents from trade. One
solution is to impose an entry fee. However, if the entry fee is too high, it will discourage newcomers
from starting deals. To resolve the conflict between safety and convenience, we developed three
exchange mechanisms that can guarantee against defection from a contract. Two of them reduce
the entry fee by integrating multiple deals and controlling the flow of goods and money. The other
reduces the entry fee by incorporating a third-party agent into the exchange process. We examine
the lower bound of the entry fee for both of these mechanisms and describe a calculation method by
which this value can be obtained in linear time. Our results show that the described mechanism can
effectively reduce the lower bound of the entry fee.
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1. Introduction
Agent technologies offer new opportunities for trading goods/resources/tasks. First, in
agent-mediated electronic commerce, agents can handle a variety of tasks including finding
goods, finding sellers/buyers, and negotiating prices, which reduces our workload and
mitigates information overload [6]. For example, many of Internet auction sites provide
automatic bidding agents. Second, agent technologies can contribute to solve resource
allocation problems. It becomes significant to develop an efficient method for utilizing
distributed information resources such as CPU time, storage spaces, and databases in the
Internet.
To date, many multiagent researchers have discussed good/resource/task trading
problems among self-interested agents, including insincere and strategic agents, and have
tried to provide a theoretical framework for these problems based on economics and game
theory, e.g., negotiation protocols [8,14,17] and auction protocols [5,12,16,21–23].
However, these research efforts have not given sufficient attention to the process after
the good/resource/task is assigned, namely, whether each agent is motivated to carry out
its contract, although some research projects have focused on exchange processes [18,19].
Sandholm et al. described an unenforced exchange mechanism whereby self-interested
agents carry out their exchange obligations without defection [18,19].
In the real-world trading in the Internet, there have been reports of auction winners
transferring large sums of money to sellers who then disappear without delivering any
goods [11]. Namely, such online deals have become risky, i.e., there is much fraud in the
process of exchanges involving goods and money. The fact that it is difficult to identify
and trace each seller/buyer in a network environment makes this problem serious. Even
if we can consult the trade data, it often costs a lot to actually reach the problematic
seller/buyer. Similar risks are associated with the trading environment including artificial
agents. Therefore, developing safe exchange mechanisms is an urgent task and this is a
challenge to make agents to work in the real trading environment.
One of the reasons why online fraud is widespread is that obtaining a new identifier in
a network is cheap, for example, it is easy to obtain a free e-mail account. This feature
raises various problems. In the process of allocating goods by using an auction protocol,
a bidder’s strategic manipulation benefits him/her by allowing the bidder to submit bids
under multiple identifiers. Earlier, we addressed this problem, that is, we discussed the
robustness of auction protocols against false-name bids [15,23]. In contrast, in the process
of exchanges involving goods and money, the above feature makes it difficult to exclude a
dishonest seller or buyer from deals, because he or she can reappear under a new identifier
without paying any penalty.
This paper concentrates on exchange processes after some trading contracts are entered
into, especially exchanges between indivisible goods and divisible goods. Here, an
indivisible good is a good that cannot be divided into small portions or, even if it can
be divided into small portions, each portion cannot be given a valuation value, while a
divisible good is a good that can be divided into small portions and each portion can be
given a valuation value. The former includes software, information, audio/video content,
and computation results, while the latter includes money, CPU time, memory, and storage
spaces.
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An agent’s defection like that described for the Internet auction example may occur in
several domains as follows:
• person-to-person trade in Internet auctions: agents of auction winners transferring
large sums of money to seller agents, who then disappear without delivering any goods.
• task delegation in peer-to-peer networks: a peer agent being asked to carry out some
calculation tasks by another peer agent, who then disappears without paying any
compensation fee.
• task exchange between agents in a temporally organized group: agent1 executing
delivering task task2 for agent2, who then disappears without executing delivering
task task1 for agent1, where task2 includes more than one goods but task1 includes a
single good.
In the rest of this paper, we discuss exchange processes involving goods and money in
electronic commerce, although our discussion can be extended to the other situations
described above.
One way to prevent participants from defecting is to verify the identity of each
seller/buyer agent by associating its user with an established identifier, e.g., by requiring
a copy of his/her driver’s license. However, checking identifiers of a large number of
sellers/buyers is expensive and can discourage good sellers/buyers from participating in
deals. For example, people change their behaviors if they have to use the same identifier for
their hobbies as well as for business. This restricts their activities. The aim of this research
is to develop mechanisms that can guarantee safe exchange while allowing participants to
have more than one identifier.
One available method for allowing participants to have more than one identifier while
enabling them to avoid defection is by using escrow services. Escrow services have recently
come to be provided by many Internet auction sites. The mechanism is as follows. First,
the buyer sends money to the center. Then the seller sends the good to the buyer. After the
buyer inspects the good, if there is no problem, the center sends the money to the seller.
This protocol does not motivate either the seller or the buyer to defect at any point in the
exchange. However, escrow services do not appear to be popular. One reason is that the
escrow-service fee is high.
To solve the problem of online fraud, we impose an entry fee on newcomers under the
assumption that the participants will make repeated deals. Note that in different domains
from person-to-person trade, imposing an entry fee corresponds to imposing a provision of
CPU resources, or an execution of some tasks on newcomers. If this entry fee is sufficiently
high, no offending buyer/seller would consider defecting since he/she would get paid less,
because the temporary profit would be spent to cover the second entry fee. However, if
the entry fee is too high, it will discourage newcomers from starting deals. Therefore, it is
necessary to reduce the entry fee while preventing participants from defecting.
To solve this conflict, we developed three exchange mechanisms that guarantee safe
exchanges. Two of them reduce the entry fee by integrating multiple deals and controlling
the flow of goods and money. Gathering multiple deals together is feasible and can be done,
for example, at auction sites. The other mechanism reduces the entry fee by incorporating
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a third-party agent into deals. The procedures of these mechanisms seem complicated for
humans but are not complicated for artificial agents.
Moreover, we examine the lower bound of the entry fee for our mechanisms and
derive conditions so that completion is dominant over defection, that is, completing the
transaction results in a Nash equilibrium. We believe that an equilibrium analysis is an
appropriate approach because it enables us to predict what happens in a mechanism in a
broader context. Then, we develop an efficient method for finding the lower bound of an
entry fee and a group division and prove that this method can provide the lower bound of
an entry fee.
The use of an entry fee has been discussed by Friedman and Resnick [2]. They addressed
the iterated prisoner’s dilemma problem concerning the fact that obtaining a new identifier
is cheap. The original contribution of our paper (1) introduces a formal model of an entry
fee design for a defection prevention problem, (2) gives the analysis of the lower bound of
an entry fee, (3) introduces three exchange protocols that reduce the entry fee, (4) proves
that our methods can prevent agents from defecting, and (5) experimentally shows that our
mechanism can reduce the entry fee.
An interesting point of our mechanisms can be explained as follows. Another way
to prevent an agent’s defection instead of using an entry fee is to split the exchange
process into small parts, so that each seller/buyer can at no point obtain profits larger than
the profits obtained by carrying out the remainder of the exchange [19]. This splitting-
exchange protocol is based on the same idea as our protocol: to prevent the emergence of
a state where an agent has both the goods and a large amount of the money. The difference
between these protocols is that while the splitting-exchange protocol implements the idea
by splitting a transaction in terms of a time axis, our protocols implement the idea by
splitting transactions in terms of a set of agents.
Section 2 describes the model of exchanges involving goods and money. In Section 3,
we discuss an entry fee for a single deal, and, in Section 4, we discuss an entry fee for
multiple deals. In Section 5, we explain how the entry fee can be reduced by incorporating
a third-party agent. Section 6 discusses related research. In Section 7, we provide our
conclusions.
2. The basic model of exchanges involving goods and money
This section describes the model of exchanges involving goods and money. There are
agents (sellers/buyers), goods, and a center. The agents are self-interested, i.e., they behave
in a way to maximize their profit. Each agent can make a deal with other agents. The
center collects entry fees in the manner described below and controls the flow of goods
and money.
This paper assumes the following. First, we assume that the center can be trusted, while
the agents may defect. Second, we assume that each agent makes deals repeatedly. Third,
we assume that the goods may be indivisible. If we deal with information goods, such as
software, audio/video contents, or market information, they should be treated as indivisible.
A deal is defined as follows.
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Definition 1. A deali is defined as a 3-tuple (pi, ci, vi), where pi is the dealing price, ci
is selleri ’s valuation of the good, and vi is buyeri ’s valuation of the good. The value of ci
can be viewed as the cost for the seller to produce the good.
The dealing price means a selling price, and is determined by using a pricing method,
such as an auction. While the problem of price determination, especially for information
goods, is important [7,10,20], it is beyond the scope of this paper.
The profit of each agent from a deal is defined as follows.
Definition 2. After deali is completed, the seller obtains a profit by pi − ci , and the buyer
obtains a profit by vi − pi .
Here, we assume that selleri bears cost ci just before delivering the good to buyeri , i.e.,
if the seller stops the exchange, he/she does not have to pay cost ci . Because both the seller
and the buyer agree on the deal, the condition that ci  pi  vi must be held.
Each round t has n(t) deals. In this paper, we fix n(t) at n. In each round, each agent
makes, at the most, one deal under one identifier, i.e., the following results do not occur
in any round: (1) an agent sells more than one good to different buyers, (2) an agent buys
more than one good from different sellers, (3) an agent sells goods and buys other goods at
the same time.1 Newcomers may participate in places where deals occur, but no participant
can opt out of a place. That is, it is assumed that all agents will make periodic deals in the
future, as mentioned above.
We impose entry fee pe on each agent. The place where deals are made is described as
follows.
Definition 3. The place of deals M in round t is defined as a 4-tuple ({agenti}, {goodj },
{dealk}, pe) (1 k  n).
Here, {agenti} denotes the set of agents in the place of deals M .
There are two ways to impose an entry fee on the agents:
Method 1. The entry fee will be collected only for the first deal from each participant, and
it is not refunded. Paying the entry fee in this case means obtaining the right to permanently
participate in deals.
Method 2. The entry fee will be collected for each deal from each participant and refunded
after the deal is completed. However, the entry fee will not be refunded to a participant who
defects from the deal.
In later sections, we will discuss mechanisms that can reduce the entry fee. The worth
of reducing the entry fee is slightly different in the above methods. In method 1, because
1 We can allow an agent to pay entry fees twice for two identifiers and make two deals under these two
identifiers by slightly modifying the discussion in later sections. Even if an agent fakes a deal by using two
identifiers and tries to deceive other agents, our method can prevent this deception.
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the entry fee is not refunded, reducing the fee directly leads to encouraging newcomers to
participate in deals.
In contrast, in method 2, because the entry fee is refunded, reducing it seems
unimportant. However, let’s consider a case where agents do not have enough money to
pay both a high entry fee and the price of the good, while they have enough money to pay
both a low entry fee and the price of the good. In this case, if the entry fee is high, the agents
cannot participate in the deal, even if the entry fee is refunded after the deal is completed.
Thus, reducing the entry fee in method 2 also encourages the agents to participate in a deal,
although not all agents benefit from it.
Additionally, the workload of the center in method 2 is greater than that of the center
in method 1. The reason for this is as follows. While the role of the center in method 1 is
to collect an entry fee, keep the list of participants, and provide information about the flow
of goods and money, the center in method 2, in addition to the functions described for the
center in method 1, has to decide whether to give the entry fee back to the agents. Which
method should be adopted depends on the nature of the place of the deals.
3. Exchange between two agents
This section describes a single deal, i.e., a good/money exchange between a seller and
a buyer, and examines the necessary conditions for the entry fee to complete the exchange
without defection. Defection means that the seller does not send the good to the buyer
while the seller receives the money from the buyer, or, that the buyer does not send the
money to the seller while the buyer receives the good from the seller. If an agent defects,
he/she cannot keep using the same identifier because the center will exclude deals under
that identifier.
We compare the following strategies:
– defecting: to obtain a greater profit by defecting from the current round and take on a
new identifier paying an entry fee in the next round.
– completing: to obtain a smaller profit by completing the exchange in the current round
and use the same identifier without paying the entry fee in the next round.
If we adopt method 2 described in Section 2, i.e., refunding the entry fee to all agents
after the deal is completed, the above defection strategy means that the agents obtain
a greater profit by defecting from the current round and give up getting the entry fee
back, while the above completion strategy means that the agents obtain a smaller profit
by completing the exchange in the current round and get the entry fee back. The following
discussion in this paper addresses the situation described in method 1 in Section 2, namely,
when the entry fee is not refunded. We can have a similar discussion about the situation
described in method 2, namely, when the entry fee is refunded.
A necessary condition for the entry fee to be effective in preventing an agent’s defection
is that the profit obtained by defection is less than the profit obtained by completion of the
deal. Note that, in this paper, we assume that agents do not defect if the profit obtained by
defecting is equal to the profit obtained by completing the exchange.
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We consider two simple protocols. In one, the seller first delivers the good to the buyer,
and then the buyer pays the money to the seller. In the other, the buyer first makes a payment
to the seller, and then the seller delivers the good to the buyer.
In the former case, the condition for the buyer where vi − pe  vi − pi , i.e., pi  pe,
must be satisfied to prevent the buyer from defecting. This inequality means that the profit
obtained by completion of the deal (on the right) must be larger than or equal to the profit
obtained by defection (on the left). In this condition, the term representing the entry fee
for the first participation, pe , is omitted from both sides, because its payment is the same
in both the defection and the completion strategies. Term −pe on the left of the inequality
represents the second entry fee that the buyer must pay for taking on a new identifier in
the next round. In this case, we do not have to consider the seller’s defection, because the
seller cannot defect.
In the latter case, however, the condition for the seller, pi − pe  pi − ci , i.e., ci  pe,
must be satisfied to prevent the seller from defecting.2 This inequality means that the profit
obtained by completing the deal (on the right) must be larger than or equal to the profit
obtained by defecting (on the left). In this condition, the term representing the entry fee for
the first participation, pe, is also omitted from both sides. In this case, we do not have to
consider the buyer’s defection, because the buyer cannot defect.
From the condition that ci  pi  vi described in Section 2, the lower bound of entry fee
pe becomes ci when the latter protocol is adopted. Our objective is to reduce this bound.
Our basic idea in designing a safe exchange protocol is to prevent the emergence of
a state where the agent has both the good and a large amount of the money. We will
examine the following protocol for reducing the entry fee. Here, note that a good may be an
indivisible good. In the place of deals, the center keeps a blacklist that lists the identifiers
of agents who committed fraud in the past.
One seller/one buyer exchange protocol.
For deali ,
(1) selleri and buyeri report their identifiers to the center. If both of identifiers or either of
identifiers is listed on the blacklist, the center stops the exchange.
(2) If selleri is a newcomer, he/she pays entry fee pe to the center. If buyeri is a newcomer,
he/she pays entry fee pe to the center.
(3) buyeri pays down payment x to selleri .
(4) If selleri receives down payment x , he/she delivers goodi to buyeri .
(5) When buyeri receives the good, he/she pays the remainder, pi − x , to selleri .
If either of the participants defects in the middle of the exchange process, the exchange
process stops and the identifier of the participant who defected is reported to the center.
2 The entry fee is imposed only in the first participation. Therefore, even if the entry fee is high, if each agent
makes several deals, the participation can benefit the agent, i.e., the participation can be individually rational. If
we adopt method 2, in which the entry fee is refunded after the deal is completed, individual rationality always
holds.
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We then examined the lower bound of the entry fee. The point where selleri may defect
is after step 3. The condition for selleri not to defect, i.e., to deliver the good after he/she
receives down payment x , is given by the following inequality:
x − pe  pi − ci. (1)
The left side represents the profit obtained by defecting and paying the entry fee once
again, while the right side represents the profit obtained by completing the exchange, i.e.,
the difference between the seller’s income and the cost for him/her to produce the good. In
this inequality, the term representing the entry fee for the first participation, pe, is omitted
from both sides, because its payment is the same in both the defection and the completion
strategies. From this inequality, we can conclude that to prevent selleri from defecting, no
one must pay selleri a down payment exceeding pi − ci + pe.
On the other hand, the point where buyeri may defect is after step 4. The condition for
buyeri not to defect, i.e., to pay the remainder, pi −x , is given by the following inequality:
vi − x − pe  vi − pi. (2)
The left side represents the profit obtained by defecting, i.e., vi−x , and paying the entry fee
once again, while the right side represents the profit obtained by completing the exchange,
i.e, the difference between the buyer’s valuation of the good and his/her payment. In this
inequality, the term representing the entry fee for the first participation, pe, is omitted
from both sides, because its payment is the same in both the defection and the completion
strategies. From this inequality, we can conclude that to prevent buyeri from defecting, we
have to make buyeri pay a down payment of more than pi − pe .
From the above discussion, in order to prevent both the seller and the buyer from
defecting, the above conditions, (1) and (2), must be satisfied. This means that if we
impose an entry fee that satisfies these conditions, completing the exchange is in a Nash
equilibrium for both the seller and the buyer [4]. That is, compared to defecting, completing
the transaction results in a payoff.
Proposition 1. The lower bound of entry fee pe to prevent an agent from defecting is half
of selleri ’s valuation for good ci . In this case, down payment x is pi − ci/2.
Proof. Entry fee pe becomes minimum at the point where the down payment that a seller
is allowed to receive is equal to the down payment that a buyer has to pay. By satisfying
this condition for balance in the down payment, i.e., pi − ci + pe = pi − pe , we find that
pe = ci/2. In this case, the down payment is calculated to be x = pi −pe = pi − ci/2. ✷
Example 1. For deal (200,100,300), i.e., when the dealing price is 200, the seller’s
valuation is 100, and the buyer’s valuation is 300, the minimum entry fee is calculated
to be 100/2 = 50. If we set the entry fee at 49, the buyer must not pay more than
200 − 100 + 49 = 149 to the seller to prevent the seller from defecting, while we have
to make the buyer pay more than 200 − 49 = 151. Therefore, no entry fee lower than 50
can prevent both the seller and the buyer from defecting.
In bilateral trade negotiations, telling the truth about valuations is not in equilibrium for
agents on the condition that the ex post efficiency and individual rationality are satisfied [9].
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If we do not know the seller’s true valuation of the good, we use an estimated value. If we
cannot estimate an accurate value, we can substitute dealing price pi for seller’s valuation
ci . This is because pi is the upper bound of ci . However, if the difference between pi and
ci is too large, this requires an entry fee that is very large.
4. Integrating multiple deals
4.1. Problems in integrating multiple deals
In the place of deals M , there are n deals in each round. For example, at an auction site,
multiple deals can be made in a day, and each seller’s cost and/or dealing price can differ
from that of others. To prevent agents from defecting in a deal, we have to set an entry
fee of a value determined as follows: (1) calculate the minimum entry fee for each deal by
using the method described in the previous section, and (2) apply the maximum value of all
these minimum entry fees to all deals. This is because the center cannot impose different
entry fees on different agents, since the center does not know in advance what deals each
agent will make in the future.3
If the center sets the entry fee at the maximum value, some agents who intend to make
deals involving only a small sum will be discouraged from participating in deals, because
they will have to pay too high an entry fee to buy what they want. Thus, to encourage
agents to participate in deals, we need a method to reduce the entry fee for multiple deals.
In this section, we describe three protocols: the time-priority exchange protocol, the
entry-fee-priority exchange protocol, and the third-party-agent exchange protocol.
The time-priority exchange protocol can reduce the entry fee by controlling the order of
delivering goods and making payments. The basic idea is as follows. This protocol divides
a deal set into two subsets, GH and GL. First, agents in GH start to carry out transactions,
and then agents in GL carry out transactions. In this protocol, payments are made between
GH and GL, that is, buyers in GH pay sellers in GL and buyers in GL pay sellers in GH .
This means that agents in GL act as intermediaries between sellers and buyers in GH as if
the agents in GL are the center that provides escrow services. This is how our protocol can
reduce the entry fee.
Payments between buyers and sellers of different deals may seem unrealistic. However,
this is possible because money can be paid by any buyer to the seller if the budget balances,
while the good is delivered from the seller to the buyer directly, especially if the good is
an information good. That is, the buyer does not care to whom he/she pays as long as
he/she can obtain the good without paying more than his/her dealing price. The seller also
does not care from whom he/she receives the money as long as he/she can obtain the same
amount of money as his/her dealing price.
The principle of payments between buyers and sellers of different deals is described as
follows. Let c1 be the maximum value of all the sellers’ valuations (c1 > ci, 2  i  n).
3 If we adopt method 2 described in Section 2, namely, the entry fee is collected for each deal from each agent
and is refunded after each of the deals is completed, the center can impose different entry fees on different agents.
However, a uniform entry fee makes it easy for the center to manage many deals.
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Suppose that entry fee pe is set at a value less than c1/2. In deal1, the upper bound of the
down payment that seller1 is allowed to receive is p1 − c1 + pe , and the lower bound of
the down payment that buyer1 must pay is p1 − pe. The amount in excess of the down
payment can be expressed as follows:
(p1 − pe)− (p1 − c1 + pe)= c1 − 2pe > 0.
Because the amount in excess of the down payment, c1 − 2pe, cannot be held by either
seller1 or buyer1, our protocol asks sellers in GL to hold this excess amount.
The entry-fee-priority protocol is a variation of the time-priority exchange protocol.
Before we describe the difference between the time-priority and the entry-fee-priority
protocols, we define the dealing time as follows.
Definition 4. It takes one step to complete each of the following processes: the buyer pays
money to the seller, and the seller delivers the good to the buyer.
If multiple deals in a round are made separately, the number of steps to complete a
round is three. The time-priority exchange protocol enables completing each round in five
steps, and the entry-fee-priority exchange protocol enables further lowering the entry fee
but requires 2n+ 1 steps, in the worst-case scenario, for each round to be completed.
The third-party-agent exchange protocol can reduce the entry fee by incorporating
third-party agents into exchange processes. In our protocol, third-party agents act as
intermediaries between sellers and buyers as if these third-party agents are the center that
provides escrow services. This is how our protocol can reduce the entry fee. Note that the
third-party-agent exchange protocol as well as the former two protocols assumes that a
center exists. The difference between third-party agents and the center in our protocol is
that third-party agents are assumed to be self-interested, while the center is not.
4.2. Time-priority exchange protocol
Time-priority exchange protocol.
(1) Divide deal set {deali} in a round into two subsets, GH and GL. The method of
division is described in Section 4.3.
(2) buyeri of deali in GH pays x1 = pi − ci + pe to selleri of deali , and x2 =
(pi − pe)− (pi − ci + pe)= ci − 2pe to sellers of deals in GL. In these payments,
payment x3 for sellerj of dealj in GL must not exceed min{pj − cj + pe,pj }. We
will explain later why the budget that exceeds the down payment is balanced. Note
that the center determines the assignment of the down payment so that condition
x3min{pj − cj + pe,pj } is satisfied.
(3) If selleri of deali in GH receives down payment x1 and learns that some other agents
received x2 from buyeri , selleri delivers goodi to buyeri .
(4) If buyeri of deali in GH receives goodi , buyeri pays the remainder, pi − x1− x2, to
selleri .
S. Matsubara, M. Yokoo / Artificial Intelligence 142 (2002) 265–286 275
(5) If buyerj of dealj in GL learns that buyeri receives goodi , buyerj pays x3 to selleri
of deali and x4 = max{pj − cj /2 − x3,0} to sellerj of dealj . The value of x3 is the
same as that of x3 in step 2.
(6) If sellerj of dealj in GL receives down payments x3 and x4, he/she delivers goodj to
buyerj .
(7) If buyerj of dealj in GL receives goodj , buyerj pays the remainder, pj − x3− x4, to
sellerj .
In each step, if a seller/buyer defects, no buyer/seller pays/delivers anything to him/her
in the later steps. Although the information about defections is managed by the center,
for simplicity, we omit communication between the sellers/buyers and the center from the
above description.
In step 2, if payment x3 for sellerj of dealj in GL exceeds pj −cj +pe, sellerj defects,
and if payment x3 exceeds pj , an amount of money equal to x3 − pj must be further
transfered from sellerj to the others, which makes deals complicated. Thus, payment x3
must not exceed min{pj − cj + pe,pj }.
The condition that an inequality, x3  min{pj − cj + pe,pj }, is maintained for each
payment from buyers of deals in GH to sellers of deals in GL in step 2 is given by the
following inequality:
∑
deali∈GH
max{ci − 2pe,0} 
∑
dealj∈GL
min{pj − cj + pe,pj }. (3)
The left side represents the sum of the amount in excess of the down payments for deals
in GH , while the right side represents the sum of the amounts of money that sellers in GL
can hold after step 2.
The condition for the down payment whereby neither sellers nor buyers of deals in GL
are motivated to defect in steps 6 and 7, is given by the following inequality:
pe  max
dealj∈GL
cj /2. (4)
This is obtained from Proposition 1.
If we set pe at a sufficiently large value, both conditions (3) and (4) are satisfied. Thus,
a value of pe must be set so that a feasible assignment of payments can be made.
Example 2. There are two deals in a round: deal1: (200,100,300) and deal2: (400,200,
600).
If we handle the two deals separately, based on Proposition 1, the minimum entry fees
to prevent agents from defecting are pe = 100/2= 50 for deal1 and pe = 200/2= 100 for
deal2. Therefore, if we impose a uniform entry fee on all agents, the entry fee must be set
at 100. This means that if the agents of deal1 are newcomers, each of them must pay 100
as an entry fee while the profit of each agent from the deal will be equal to 100 (seller1:
200− 100= 100, buyer1: 300− 200= 100).
Consider the case when the time-priority exchange protocol is used for the above two
deals. Let deal2 ∈GH and deal1 ∈GL. If pe = 50, both condition (3), i.e., 200 − 2pe 
min{200− 100+pe,200}, and condition (4), i.e., pe  100/2, are satisfied; thus pe = 50.
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This means that, in contrast to the former case, in this case we can lower the entry fee from
100 to 50. Let us examine the exchange process in detail:
1. buyer2 pays 400− 200+ 50 = 250 to seller2, and 200− 2× 50 = 100 to seller1.
2. seller2 delivers good2 to buyer2.
3a. buyer2 pays the remainder, 400− 250− 100= 50, to seller2.
3b. buyer1 pays 100 to seller2, and 200− 100/2− 100= 50 to seller1.
4. seller1 delivers good1 to buyer1.
5. buyer1 pays the remainder, 200− 100− 50 = 50, to seller1.
Step 3a and step 3b can be done in parallel. As mentioned earlier, if we handle multiple
deals separately, each round is completed in three steps, because all exchanges can be done
in parallel. In contrast, if we use the time-priority exchange protocol, each round requires
five steps to be completed.
In each step, completion of the transaction results in a payoff compared with defection.
Moreover, each agent’s budget is balanced after the last step.
The following proposition guarantees that our protocol can prevent agents from
defecting, i.e., no agent is motivated to defect if other agents complete their exchanges.
Proposition 2. In the time-priority exchange protocol, it is in a Nash equilibrium for each
agent to complete the exchanges.
Proof. For sellers and buyers of deals in GH , it is clear that conditions (1) and (2)
are satisfied. Next, let’s consider sellers and buyers of deals in GL. In the case of
x3  pj − cj /2, the seller received x3 + x4 = pj − cj /2 before step 6, i.e., before
delivering the good, and the buyer already paid x3+ x4 for receiving the good after step 6.
Here, pj − pe  pj − cj /2  pj − cj + pe is maintained because the value of pe is
such that condition (4) is satisfied. This satisfies conditions (1) and (2). In the case where
x3 >pj −cj /2, i.e., x4 = 0, the seller did not receive more than pj −cj +pe before step 6,
and the buyer already paid more than pj − cj /2 after step 6. This satisfies conditions (1)
and (2). In the other steps, both conditions (1) and (2) are also satisfied. This means that
no agent can obtain a profit greater than the profit obtained by completing the exchange,
even if he/she defects in any of the steps. Thus, if the other agents do not defect, no agent
is motivated to defect. ✷
As we proved above, a Nash equilibrium means a strategy combination where no
agent has the incentive to deviate from his/her strategy given that the other agents do
not deviate. However, there are many equilibrium concepts, one of which is a dominant
strategy equilibrium. A dominant strategy equilibrium is a strategy combination consisting
of each agent’s dominant strategy. Here, a dominant strategy means one that is a strictly
best response to any strategies the other agents might pick [13]. Although the completion
strategy is in a Nash equilibrium in the proposed protocol, it is not in a dominant
strategy.
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Some researchers say that a Nash equilibrium is not an appropriate solution concept in
the Internet environment because a priori information is limited for an agent [3]; namely,
an agent cannot ascertain whether the other agents face the same situation. However, it
is often difficult to design a mechanism that has a dominant strategy. Especially in trade
situations, if a buyer/seller deviates, the corresponding seller/buyer cannot avoid suffering
a loss. Therefore, we believe that an analysis based on a Nash equilibrium is appropriate in
trade situations.
4.3. Deal-set division and entry-fee calculation
We will now describe how a deal set is divided into two subsets and how the entry
fee is calculated. Our method enables deal-set division and minimum-entry-fee calculation
in O(n) time. Because the terms in labeling a deal are arbitrary, let c1  c2  · · ·  cn.
Let’s assume that GH includes deal1, . . . ,dealk , and GL includes dealk+1, . . . ,dealn.
We rename pe as p1e and p2e so that these satisfy the equality in conditions (3) and
(4), respectively. Changing the value of k from 1 to n − 1, we choose k = k∗ so that
max{p1e ,p2e } is minimized. The minimum entry fee, p∗e , to prevent agents from defecting
becomes the value of max{p1e ,p2e } for k∗.
Example 3. The following two examples show how to divide a deal set. Here, we assume
that ci = pi .
Case 1 (the distribution of dealing prices is uniform): Let’s assume that we have
deali (1  i  8) so that pi = 900 − 100i . Our method of division gives an entry fee
of 230 and the following two subsets:
GH = {deal1,deal2,deal3,deal4},
GL = {deal5,deal6,deal7,deal8}.
Case 2 (only one dealing price is high): Let’s assume that we have deal1 (p1 = 1000),
deal2, . . . ,deal9 (pi = 100 (2  i  9)). Our method gives an entry fee of 100 and the
following two subsets:
GH = {deal1},
GL = {deal2,deal3, . . . ,deal9}.
We will now show that p∗e is the lower bound for preventing agents’ defection in the
time-priority exchange protocol. To make the discussion simple, we assume that ci = pi .
This corresponds to a case where the market is competitive or when pi , i.e., the upper
bound of ci , is used because the true value of ci is unknown. The case where ci < pi can
be analyzed in the same way as follows.
Proposition 3. In the time-priority exchange protocol, entry fee p∗e that is calculated by
our method is the lower bound for preventing agents’ defection.
To prove this proposition, we used the following lemmas.
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Lemma 4. Place all dealing prices, pi , in descending order. Let GH include the first k
deals and GL include the rest of the deals. The maximum value of all the dealing prices
in GL is represented by pLmax. Here, we perform new divisions (G′H ,G′L) by transferring
some deals other than the deal of pLmax from GL to GH . If we take 1 to n− 1 to be the
value of k, {(GH ,GL)} ∪ {(G′H ,G′L)} covers all possible divisions.
Lemma 5. Place all dealing prices, pi , in descending order. Let GH include the first k
deals and GL include the rest of the deals. The maximum value of all the dealing prices
in GL is represented by pLmax. Here, even if we transfer some deals other than the deal of
pLmax from GL to GH , the minimum entry fee does not decrease.
Proof. Because pLmax does not change, p2e , calculated based on condition (4), does not
change. Based on condition (3), p1e is the value that satisfies the following equation:
k∑
i=1
max
{
pi − 2p1e ,0
}=
n∑
i=k+1
min
{
p1e ,pi
}
. (5)
Here, p1e is obtained as the point of intersection between y =
∑k
i=1 max{pi − 2p1e ,0} and
y =∑ni=k+1 min{p1e ,pi}. Now, let p1
′
e denote the value of p1e for a division performed by
transferring pj from GL to GH . p1
′
e is the value that satisfies the following equation:
k∑
i=1
max
{
pi − 2p1′e ,0
}+max{pj − 2p1′e ,0
}
=
n∑
i=k+1
min
{
p1
′
e ,pi
}−min{p1′e ,pj
}
. (6)
The left sides of Eqs. (5) and (6) are non-increasing functions to p1e (p1
′
e ), and the latter
is always larger than or equal to the former; the right sides of Eqs. (5) and (6) are
non-decreasing functions to p1e (p1
′
e ), and the former is always larger than or equal to
the latter. By considering the point of intersection between y =∑ki=1 max{pi − 2p1e ,0}
and y =∑ni=k+1 min{p1e ,pi}, and the point of intersection between y =
∑k
i=1 max{pi −
2p1′e ,0} + max{pj − 2p1′e ,0} and y =
∑n
i=k+1 min{p1
′
e ,pi} − min{p1′e ,pj }, we find that
inequality p1e < p1
′
e is held.
(1) If p1e  p2e and p1
′
e  p2e , the minimum value of the entry fee does not change because
p∗e = max{p1′e ,p2e } = p2e .
(2) If p1e  p2e and p1
′
e > p
2
e , the minimum value of the entry fee does not decrease because
p∗e = max{p1′e ,p2e } = p1′e > p2e .
(3) The case of p1e > p2e and p1
′
e  p2e does not occur because p1e < p1
′
e .
(4) If p1e > p2e and p1
′
e > p
2
e , the minimum value of the entry fee does not decrease because
p∗e = max{p1′e ,p2e } = p1′e > p1e .
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Thus, transferring a deal other than the deal of pLmax from GL to GH does not reduce the
minimum entry fee. For cases when we transfer more than one deal from GL to GH , a
similar discussion holds. ✷
Proof of Proposition 3. From the above lemmas, the entry fee calculated by the division
performed by placing all dealing prices, pi , in descending order, while letting GH include
the first k deals and GL include the rest of the deals, is the minimum value of all the
divisions where the value of pLmax is the same. Thus, if we choose the minimum value
when taking 1 to n− 1 as k, the value is the minimum value of all possible divisions. ✷
We point out that although the procedure of the proposed protocol seems complicated,
it is not for an artificial agent.
We showed a method for calculating the lower bound of an entry fee, if a deal set is
given. However, we cannot know in advance what deal each agent will make in the future.
Therefore, we first estimate the probability distribution of the seller’s valuation and dealing
price of all deals, and then calculate, based on this probability distribution, the appropriate
amount of the entry fee.
4.4. Experimental evaluation
We evaluated the effectiveness of the time-priority exchange protocol by comparing this
protocol with a protocol that handles all deals separately. In this evaluation, we assumed
that seller’s valuation ci was equal to dealing price pi . We examined two types of dealing-
price distributions: uniform and exponential.
In an exponential distribution, there are many trades whose dealing prices are low and
a few trades whose dealing prices are high. A market place is likely to exist that has many
trades of cheap commodity and a few trades of expensive valuables. This situation is one of
the situations in which a simple separate-deal protocol does not work well. This is because
a buyer/seller whose dealing price is low will be discouraged from starting a deal if a high
entry fee is imposed. Thus, the proposed protocol should be examined in this situation to
evaluate its performance.
In a uniform distribution case, the dealing price is drawn from a uniform distribution
over [100,200]. In an exponential distribution case, the dealing price is drawn from
an exponential distribution for which the probability density function is f (pi) = a ·
exp(−(pi − 100)/10) (100  pi  200), where a is a constant such that an integral
of f (pi) in interval [100,200] is equal to 1. We also assumed that the dealing prices
included in each round are independent. Under these conditions, the value of the entry
fee that prevents agents’ defection ranges from 50 (= 100/2) to 100 (= 200/2) in both
distributions.
Fig. 1 shows our experimental results, i.e., the entry fee for the case when multiple
deals are handled separately, and the entry fee for the case when the time-priority exchange
protocol is used. In these figures, the x-axis represents the number of deals in a round, while
the y-axis represents the minimum value of the entry fee that prevents agents’ defection.
Each point in the figures represents an average value of the minimum entry fees in 100
instances.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Entry-fee comparison. (a) Uniform distribution. (b) Exponential distribution.
These figures indicate that if multiple deals are handled separately, an entry fee must be
set at a higher value, i.e., the highest value of the entry-fee values in these 100 instances.
Therefore, as the number of deals in a round increases, the entry fee must become higher.
However, the described method can lower the entry fee regardless of the number of
deals in a round. In particular, in the exponential distribution, we can set the entry fee at a
value around 50, that is, the lower bound, because the dealing price is around 100 in most
deals and the dealing price is high only in a small number of deals.
The following list summarizes the properties of the time-priority exchange protocol
compared to the protocol that handles all deals separately:
• The time-priority exchange protocol can reduce the entry fee compared to a simple
separate-deal protocol. Especially in the exponential distribution case, the performance
of our protocol becomes the lower bound of the entry fee.
• The load for the center increases. However, the load of calculating an assignment of
payments is not great because this is done by assigning the maximum down payment,
min{pj − cj +pe,pj }, to each sellerj in the GL in increasing order of cj .
• In all deals, information on who is the seller and who is the buyer is disclosed to
someone other than the seller and the buyer. However, no participant can know about
other pairs of sellers and buyers outside of his/her own deal.
4.5. Entry-fee-priority exchange protocol
By ordering multiple deals in a round, we can lower the entry fee even further compared
to the entry fee in the time-priority exchange protocol. The reason is as follows.
The time-priority exchange protocol can lower the entry fee by dividing a deal set into
two subsets, GH and GL, and having agents in GL act as intermediaries between sellers
and buyers in GH . Here, if condition (3) is not binding, we can further lower the entry
fee by increasing the number of intermediaries. This procedure is as follows. First, divide
GL into two subsets, GL1 and GL2, in the same way as when we divided a deal set into
GH and GL. Then, have agents in GL2 act as intermediaries between sellers and buyers in
GL1. A necessary condition for this mechanism to work is that agents in GL1 must be the
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first to start carrying out transactions, and then the agents in GL2 carry out transactions.
This is because, if these transactions are carried out at the same time, some sellers in GL1
may be left with a large amount of money in one of the steps, in which case defection will
become dominant over completion.
From the above discussion, the entry fee can be lowered by increasing the number of
group divisions and carrying out transactions in each group in order. We call this protocol
“the entry-fee-priority exchange protocol”. It requires 2n+ 1 steps to complete a round in
the worst case.4 Here, n is the number of deals in a round.
The outline of the entry-fee-priority exchange protocol is as follows. Goods are
delivered to buyers one by one, that is, no more than one good is delivered at the same
time. Let’s assume that c1  c2  · · · cn. First, buyer1 pays down payment p1 − c1 +pe
to seller1 and down payments to selleri (2 i  n) so that the amount of these payments
is equal to p1 − pe. Here, let p′1,i denote a down payment from buyer1 to selleri . Second,
seller1 delivers good1 to buyer1. Third, buyer1 pays the remainder, pe , to seller1. Until
the amount of money paid to seller1 becomes equal to p1, buyeri (2  i  n) pays
an amount of money that does not exceed buyeri ’s dealing price pi to seller1. Here,
let p′′i,1 denote a payment from buyeri to seller1. Next, buyer2 pays down payment
max{p2 − c2 + pe − p′1,2,0} to seller1 and down payments to selleri (3 i  n) so that
the amount of these payments is equal to p2 −pe. These payments and deliveries continue
until all exchanges have been carried out.
Although we omitted a detailed description of this protocol, the following example
illustrates the exchange process.
Example 4. There are three deals: deal1: (100,100,120), deal2: (80,80,100), and deal3:
(20,20,40).
If we use the time-priority exchange protocol, the minimum entry fee needed to prevent
agents’ defection is 40. Here, let the entry fee be 30.
1. buyer1 → seller1: 30, buyer1 → seller2: 20, buyer1 → seller3: 20.
2. seller1 → buyer1: good1.
3a. buyer1 → seller1: 30, buyer2 → seller1: 40.
3b. buyer2 → seller2: 10.
4. seller2 → buyer2: good2.
5. buyer2 → seller2: 30, buyer3 → seller2: 20.
6. seller3 → buyer3: good3.
Each participant’s budget balances because each seller’s income is as follows: seller1 =
30 + 30 + 40 = 100, seller2 = 20 + 10 + 30 + 20 = 80, seller3 = 20; and each buyer’s
payment is as follows: buyer1 = 30 + 20 + 20 + 30 = 100,buyer2 = 40 + 10 + 30 =
80,buyer3 = 20. In each step, a down payment that each buyer makes or each seller
receives satisfies conditions (1) and (2) to prevent agents’ defection.
4 Each deal, deali , takes three steps to be completed. However, the last step in deali and the first step in
deali+1 can be done in parallel. Thus, this protocol requires 2n+ 1 steps to complete a round. Additionally, in
some steps, there may be nothing to do.
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We want to point out that if exchange processes are carried out by artificial agents, any
increase in the dealing time will not be significant, because each step can be completed
instantaneously.
5. Incorporating a third-party agent
If there are agents in a place of deals who do not have deals in a round, the entry fee can
be reduced by incorporating these agents into exchange processes.
The third-party-agent exchange protocol.
(1) selleri and buyeri report their identifiers to the center. If both of identifiers or either of
identifiers is listed on the blacklist, the center stops the exchange.
(2) If selleri is a newcomer, he/she pays entry fee pe to the center. If buyeri is a newcomer,
he/she pays entry fee pe to the center.
(3) The center informs selleri and buyeri of a third-party agent who is not listed on the
blacklist and who has no deals in the current round.
(4) selleri pays down payment x1 to selleri and x2 to the third-party agent.
(5) The third-party agent informs selleri that he/she has received x2 from buyeri .
(6) If selleri receives down payment x1 and learns that the third-party agent has received
x2, selleri delivers goodi to buyeri .
(7) If buyeri receives the good, buyeri pays the remainder, pi − x1 − x2, to selleri and
asks the third-party agent to pay x2 to selleri .
(8) If the third-party agent receives the request from buyeri , he/she pays x2 to selleri .
If either agent defects in the middle of the exchange process, the exchange process stops
and the identifier of the agent who defected is reported to the center.
The conditions, under which the seller/buyer/third-party agent are not motivated to
defect, are given as follows.
x1− pe  pi − ci (selleri )
vi − x1− x2− pe  vi − pi (buyeri )
x2− pe  0 (a third-party agent).
Each of the left sides represents the profit obtained by defecting and paying the entry fee
once again, while each of the right sides represents the profit obtained by completing the
exchange.
Proposition 6. The lower bound of pe for preventing agents’ defection is a third of selleri ’s
valuation for the good, i.e., ci/3. In this case, down payment x1 is pi − 2ci/3, and down
payment x2 is ci/3.
Proof. From the discussion in Section 4, if we set entry fee pe at a value less than ci/2,
the difference between the down payment that the buyer must pay and the down payment
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that the seller is allowed to receive so that neither agent defects is ci − 2pe. This is the
amount paid to the third-party agent, i.e., x2 = ci − 2pe. The entry fee is minimized if
the amount paid to the third-party agent is equal to a maximum value such that he/she is
not motivated to defect, i.e., x2 − pe = ci − 2pe − pe = 0. Therefore, pe = ci/3. In this
case,
x1= pi − ci + pe = pi − ci + ci/3 = pi − 2ci/3 and x2= pe = ci/3. ✷
Compared with Proposition 1, this protocol lowers the entry fee from ci/2 to ci/3.
The properties of the third-party-agent exchange protocol, compared with a protocol
that handles each deal separately, can be summarized as follows:
• The entry fee can be reduced by incorporating a third-party agent. The greater the
number of these third-party agents gets, the lower the entry fee. The entry fee can
be further reduced by combining this protocol with the time-priority/entry-fee-priority
exchange protocol.
• In a deal, the third-party agent will have information about the seller-buyer pair.
However, if none of the third-party agents knows how many third-party agents there
are, he/she cannot know the dealing price.
6. Discussion
In this paper, we described three protocols: the time-priority exchange protocol,
the entry-fee-priority exchange protocol, and the third-party-agent exchange protocol.
This section compares these entry-fee-based protocols with other related techniques and
clarifies the advantages and disadvantages of our protocols.
As mentioned in Section 1, escrow services have come to be available at many auction
sites, but they have not yet become popular. One of the reasons is that an escrow fee is
high. This is because the cost of managing the center is high. This cost can be reduced
by using our protocols, because the center in our protocols handles not goods and money
but information about the flow of goods and money. This means that while the center that
provides escrow services has to check all instances of receiving money in all deals, the
center in our protocols does not have to do this because this task is distributed among all
sellers.
In addition to checking, most of the tasks of the center except collecting money can be
managed by participants themselves in a dealing place, if we adopt a policy of collecting
an entry fee for the first deal, which is not refunded, from each participant. That is, if a
set of deals is given, the assignment of down payments can be calculated by participants,
although the amount of communication between agents increases. Thus, especially in a
dealing place with relatively stable participants, the center has only the task of maintaining
a blacklist that lists the identifiers of agents who had committed fraud in the past, which
results in a reduction of managing costs of the center.
One disadvantage of our protocols is our assumption that each agent makes repeated
deals. If this assumption does not hold, an agent may defect in the middle of an exchange.
284 S. Matsubara, M. Yokoo / Artificial Intelligence 142 (2002) 265–286
This problem can be mitigated by exchanging information about good participants between
the places of deals and discounting the entry fee for good participants.
Another disadvantage of our protocols is that a malicious agent may benefit from
selling short. In our protocol, a seller receives a down payment before delivering the
good. Therefore, an agent can obtain the down payment by pretending to be the seller
and disappearing after receiving the down payment. In this case, this dishonest agent’s
profit becomes equal to the difference between the down payment and the entry fee,
i.e.,
−pe + (pi − ci + pe)= pi − ci.
However, if the market is competitive, dealing price pi becomes close to seller’s
valuation ci . Thus, a dishonest agent cannot obtain an unfair profit. Although the market
is not always competitive, if we substitute pi for ci , a dishonest agent cannot obtain
an unfair profit. Also, Friedman and Resnick pointed out that an entry fee includes not
only a monetary transfer, but also the time consumed by the registration process, such as
when answering a questionnaire [2]. Therefore, a malicious agent will be discouraged from
committing fraud because he/she cannot obtain a large amount of money worth committing
this fraud.
Another disadvantage of our protocol is that we assume that an entry fee is calculated
based on the estimated probability distribution of the seller’s valuation and dealing price
of all deals. We believe that obtaining the probability distribution is not difficult because
dealing prices can be observed by the center in auction places and sellers’ valuation values
can be substituted by the dealing prices, although describing a way of estimating the
probability distribution is beyond the scope of this paper. Unfortunately, the center may
fail to obtain an accurate probability distribution. Even in such a case, we can achieve
safe exchanges by separating high dealing-price deals from other deals and resort to other
methods such as escrow services for the separated deals, which results in reducing the total
cost for handling all deals.
Another way to prevent an agent’s defection is to split the exchange process into small
parts [19], as mentioned in Section 1. The splitting-exchange protocol has the advantage of
not requiring a center, that is, the seller and buyer do not have to pay anything to a center.
However, we cannot apply this method to indivisible goods such as software deals, while
our protocols can be used for exchanges involving indivisible goods and divisible goods.
As mentioned earlier, software is usually an indivisible good. Even if software could be
divided into modules, the seller and buyer would still need to agree on how to divide
the good, and the seller would need to know the buyer’s valuation of each module. This
would become an overhead in the exchange process. In addition, if a good is divisible, we
can further lower the entry fee by incorporating the technique of the splitting-exchange
protocol into our protocols.
A limitation of our protocol is that one of the goods to be exchanged must be divisible
goods such as money. Although we can calculate an entry fee that can prevent agents from
defecting in an exchange involving only indivisible goods, the entry fee becomes high. In
such a case, escrow services are more suitable than our protocol.
Finally, we will describe other approaches to solving the online-fraud problem, which
are different from the game-theoretic approach. One is based on developing security
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measures, such as cryptographic techniques. For example, an optimistic fair exchange
protocol has been described [1]. This protocol is based on a digital-signature scheme
and can be used only for digital goods (information goods), such as electronic money.
In this protocol, a center ensures fairness of exchanges, but this process is only used in
the presence of exceptions or in the case of dishonest participants who do not follow
the protocol. This reduces the cost for the center. However, when there is trouble, this
protocol can provide only the evidence that some agent sent or received money/goods.
Thus, if a dishonest participant can disappear after receiving money, and then reappear
under a different identifier without paying any penalty, he/she can obtain an unfair profit.
Therefore, this protocol does not work if we allow participants to use multiple identifiers,
which is a virtue in transactions over the Internet.
Another approach is based on information-filtering techniques. For example, rating
mechanisms for electronic marketplaces have been described [24]. Calculation methods
were provided for rating participants. Under this approach, participants can obtain more
precise information about other participants, whereas our protocols only exclude dishonest
agents. However, in the beginning of exchanges, such rating mechanisms do not seem to
work because there is a lack of data.
7. Conclusion
We described three exchange mechanisms involving goods and money that can solve
the conflict between safety and convenience. The mechanisms can prevent agents from
defecting by imposing an entry fee on all agents; this can contribute to solving the online-
fraud problem on the Internet. We showed that these mechanisms can reduce the entry fee
without compromising safety by integrating multiple deals and/or by incorporating a third-
party agent, which facilitates the participation of newcomers. These mechanisms have a
trade-off because the lower the entry fee, the greater the amount of information disclosed
to other agents.
When our mechanism is applied to the real-world trading, a payment method may
become a problem. In this paper, we do not consider the cost of money handling by the
agent. However, if a processing fee is charged on every payment, an effectiveness of our
mechanism is reduced because a payment process is divided into more than one parts in our
mechanism. Implementing an agent having an ability to produce a settlement in a manner
consistent with existing trading mechanisms is one of our future work.
Another potential hurdle to apply our mechanism to the real-world trading is a problem
of transparency of the mechanism, i.e., comprehensibility. This means that our mechanism
may give a rather strange feeling to a user in that his/her agent makes a payment to
other agents who are not directly related to his/her deal, although his/her budget balances.
Examining this problem is another of our future work.
A different method to obtain an appropriate entry fee is to form groups in which the
variation in the sellers’ valuations for goods is small. To enable forming such groups and
keeping them attractive, it is important that research on communities complements research
on mechanism design and vice versa.
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